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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MONTE RAY HIGLEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 18970

GERALDINE WRIGHT HIGLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for divorce brought by PlaintiffRespondent, Monte Ray Higley, against Defendant-Appellant,
Geraldine Wright Higley.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Weber County, the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist presiding sitting without a jury, granted a
Decree of Divorce to each party against the other, and provided
that the Decree of Divorce should not become final until the
expiration of three months from and after the date of entry
thereof.
Wife (Defendant-Appellant) was granted the use and

occupancy of the f:imi l; l1ome i11

Hcic•fH'C.

1·1 .!11

three months unlil the divorce becomes fin.!l,
time husband (Plaintiff-Respondent)
payment thereon,

! , ,, . . 1

]'er, ,,,1

cl11ririµ

wl11ci 1

is to nuke the mortP,d''.c

together with the utility pavments on

lights, and water and during the same period, he is to make
available to wife his health and medical insurance.

Durini\

the same three-month period, husband is also to pay to wife
the sum of $150. 00 per month as temporary alimony pursuant to
a temporary order signed by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on
June 13, 1982 (R. 14).

Although this temporary alimony aware

was inadvertently omitted from the Decree of Divorce, it was
set forth in the trial judge's bench ruling (R.

212).

When the Decree becomes final at the end of the
three-month waiting period, husband is ordered to continue tc
make the house payme'.'lts for an additional three years, which
payments shall be considered temporary alimony to wife.

At

the end of the said three years, wife is to receive $100.00
per month permanent alimo'.'ly and the home in Hooper is to be
sold at that time.

The costs of sale are first to be paid

and from the remaining proceeds, wife is to receive the firs:

$6,000.00 and the remainder is to be divided equally between
the parties.
Husband is also awarded all of the tools.

the

equipment, supplies, arid contents of the welding shop.

'.JC

I!·

the

scrap and other metal; axles; a'.'ld other material and supplico
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, , I al
t lie

ed to the welding business.

He is also awarded one of

sewing machi:"1es, the 1968 Ford pickup truck and camper,

the leather tools and equipment, the movie camera, projector,
screen, one-half of the movies, and his personal things.
Wife is awarded all of the household furniture and
effects, except for four items of husband's choice.

Wife also

receives the 1967 Ford, the 1971 Dodge Colt, the 1946 GMC
pickup truck, and her personal effects.
Defendant's civil service retirement accrued during
the marriage is to be divided equally between the parties at
the time it is received, pursuant to the formula set forth in
the Utah Supreme Court case of Woodward v. Woodward cited at
656 P.2d 431.
Husband is to pay the marital debts of approximately
$2,000.00, together with $500.00 toward wife's attorney's fees
to be paid at a minimum of $25.00 per month.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Husband (Respondent) seeks an affirmation of the
trial court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts contains numerous
'"rrors and makes no citations to the pages of the record
supporting the alleged statements as required by Rule 75(b)
(2)(2) (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Husband alleges that the facts dre as follows
The parties were married to each other on June•
Salt Lake City, Utah (T.
(T.

11 & 14).

12)

Husband is

1953

ril

and wife is 4:

He did not complete high school and she is a

high school graduate (T.

11 & 14).

Five children have been

born of the marriage, all of whom are adults (T.

12).

The

two younger children are ages 21 and 19 and still live with
their mother, but contrary to wife's brief, both of these
children are employed full time, are self-supporting, and are
not attending college (T.

13, 54, 100).

Husband has been employed as a welder at Hill Air
Force Base since May, 1966 (T. 48).

His net take-home pay is

$1,159.68 in a four-week month (T. 49 & 50 and R. 24).

His

annual gross income at Hill Air Force Base is $24,356.80 (T. c
Over the years, husband has operated a small welding business
after hours and has earned additional money to help his childr;
through college (T.

62).

Husband testified that he will

probably not maintain two jobs in the future (T. 62) and wife
testified that he told her recently that he was unhappy. tirec
overworked, and just needed a rest (T.

107).

The statement which appears several places in wife''
brief that husband earns approximately $35,000.00 per year is
not true.

He has done no welding on the side since April,

1982 (T. 62) and there is no testimony in the record that
earns $10,000.00 a year on his second job.
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The only testimo1

'Jven
11•'Und

l<>

was that in the last two or three years he has earned
$9,000.00 from his second job (T. 116).

This amounts

between $3,000.00 to $4,500.00 per year, but will not

continue in the future.
Wife has considerable work experience, including
being a sales clerk at J. C. Penney's, working at a phone
answering service, operating scales for a sugar beet company,
driving truck for local farmers, and being an Avon Sales
Representative for approximately 10 years (T. 14

& 15).

She

has also taken in sewing, ironing, and done baby-sitting
(T.

117).

She also types and has done this for the business

(T. 117) and she has also kept books for the business (T. 134).
Wife underwent stomach surgery in 1972 (T. 118) and
again in 1975 (T. 119), and had a hysterectomy somewhere
between 1972 and 1975 (T. 120).

She has not been hospitalized

since that time except that she was in the hospital overnight
as the result of a minor automobile accident a year ago (T. 17).
Wife claims she was advised in 1979 that she would
need another stomach operation (T. 159).
the recommended surgery (T. 159).

She has never had

In response to her counsel's

leading question, wife testified that she is on a liquid diet
(T

121) but then testified that she eats potatoes, gravy,
and sometimes beef (T.

121 & 152).

She also stated that

,iJt' needs one deep freeze for her meat and one for her vege-

Lab le s

(T. 151).

She stated she has no health problems

other than her stomach condition (T. 124).

Since her surger

she has been physically active and has played baseball,
softball, rides bicycles and horses, and raises a large
garden each summer (T. 18) .

The tr ia 1 judge found that she

is an employable person and that most people with her health
problems work (R. 214).
The assets of the parties at the time of the trial
consisted of the following:
(a)

A home in Hooper, Utah, situated on

less than one acre of land (T. 24) on which
there is also an old, small uninhabitable
house and a building which husband has used
as a welding shop (T. 25

& 26).

Husband's

estimate of the value of said real estate is
$69,500.00, which is based on an appraisal
made of the property (T. 27 and R.

27).

There

is a mortgage on said property of $7,300.00
(T. 29), leaving an equity based on husband's
valuation of $62,200.00, with mortgage payments
of $205.00 per month.

Wife originally listed the

real property on her schedule of assets at a value
of $69,500.00 (R. 29) but thereafter testified
that she felt it was worth less than that, probably $50,000.00 to $55,000.00 (T.
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128).

She did

not have the property appraised.
(b)

Household furniture and furnish-

ings, including major appliances consisting
of three refrigerators, three deep freezes,
four television sets, a microwave oven, a
washer, dryer, and four sewing machines
(T. 153, 30,

& 31).

Husband estimates the

value of the furnishings at approximately
$5,000.00 (T.

31) and wife estimates their

value at $600.00 (T. 153).
(c)

A 1967 Ford, a 1971 Dodge Colt, and

a 1946 GMC pickup truck.

Husband estimates

the value of the Ford to be $400.00, the Colt
$500.00 and the GMC pickup truck $100.00
(T.

31

& 32).

Wife estimates the value of

the 1967 Ford at $200.00 (T. 150) and the Colt
at $100.00 (R. 29).
(d)

A 1968 Ford pickup truck which hus-

band estimates to be worth $800.00 (T.

32) and

wife claims its value is $2,500 (R. 29).
(e)

A 1971 Camper which both parties

value at $500.00 (T.
(f)

38 and 133).

Welding equipment and tools which

husband acquired with money he earned working
evenings after getting off his job at Hill Field

-7-

(T.

33).

He had an appraisal of the welding equip·

ment from Whitmore Oxygen Company of $3, 155 00
(R

19

& 20 and T. 6) and he has additional

miscellaneous welding items which were not
appraised which he values at about $500.00
(T. 33).

He also has hand and power tools

which he values at $200.00 (T.

35).

Wife

estimates the value of the welding equipment
and tools at $39,216.00 (T. 134

& R. 29).

Wife has not had the welding equipment or
tools appraised and states that her estimate
is based upon what she thinks it would cost
to replace the equipment (T. 156).
(g)

Lawn and garden tools, including

rototiller and riding lawn mower which husband values at $775.00 (T. 35
(h)

& 36 and R. 21).

Husband has firearms which he

values at $400.00 (T. 37 and R.
(i)

21).

Scrap metal which husband values at

$500.00 (T. 38 and R. 21).
(j)

Horseshoeing equipment which

husband values at $100.00 (T.
(k)

38).

Wife claims husband is building

a fifth-wheel utility trailer with a value
of $3,500.00 (T. 133).
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Husband testified

this was built for his brother (T. 73) and
the trial court made no disposition of it
in the divorce decree.

(1)

Husband has accrued civil service

retirement benefits at Hill Air Force Base in
the sum of approximately $16,000.00 (T. 40 and
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4).
(m)

At the time of their separation, the

parties had a 1972 Suzuki motorcycle but it was
stolen during the pendency of the divorce (T. 173).
Husband claimed mental cruelty as grounds for divorce
(T. 19), testifying that wife discriminated between his family
and her's (T.

that she discouraged their children from

being involved with his family and attempted to turn them
against husband (T. 19 & 21); that she was domineering, bossy,
and had to have everything her way; that her maiden name was
Wright and she told her husband she was Wright, and was born
Wright, and would always be Wright (right), meaning she was
never wrong (T. 20); that she frequently refused to have a
sexual relationship with her husband, sometimes claiming
that she was sick, although she was well enough to do other
things, including getting her hair done, or going to town,
or taking a trip (T

22); that she physically abused him by

him and tearing the shirt off his back, although he
did not strike her (T. 23 & 24).
-9-

After losing his affection

for his wife, he developed an interest in another woman
(T. 23) with whom he openly associated, even in the presence of his children (T.

98).

Wife spent much of the trial

testifying of husband's association with "the other woman".
Wife told husband she did not intend to work and
that he would have to support her the rest of his life
(T. 19

& 158), but thereafter testified that she recognized

that it would be necessary for her to be employed (T. 158).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
EACH PARTY TREATED THE OTHER CRUELLY AND THE COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A DECREE OF DIVORCE TO EACH.
Husband does not dispute the court's decision that
wife is entitled to a decree of divorce because of his
romantic activities with another woman.

There is, however,

ample evidence in the record to establish that the wife is
not faultless in this marriage and that she has been guilty
of cruel treatment, giving husband grounds for divorce.

In

addition to her misconduct testified to by husband and set
forth above in the facts,

the court correctly found that

the wife's entire life centered around the children and that
when decisions had to be made, wife always sided with the
children and against husband (R.

210).

Her preference for

the children over her husband was made very clear at the
trial when she testified that many of the husband's personal

-10-

1/iings should go to the children,
1

'"

1T

l l!ded his tools

rather than to him.

This

(T. 136), his guns (T. 137), the camper

155), his movie equipment (T. 162), his leather working

tools (T. 163), and his welding equipment (T. 164).
Although the court stated that the cause of the
divorce was the wife's reaction to the discovery of husband's
clandestine activity, the court did not find that this was
the grounds for the divorce (R. 211).

The court in a

lengthy and well reasoned bench ruling explained his viewpoint
and observation of the marital problems and concluded that
the wife could probably have saved the marriage had she
reacted differently to the discovery of her husband's romantic
activities, and had there been early marriage counseling
(See Bench Ruling R. 209-212).
Respondent husband submits that the evidence
establishes that wife is at least equally, if not more, at
fault in this marriage.

Should the court decide, however,

that the cruelty of husband has been greater than that of
wife,

this does not preclude the granting of a decree of

divorce to each party.

Appellant's argument that the case

of Mullins v. Mullins, 26 U 2d 82, 485 P2d 663, requires
that the court must find each party equally at fault in order
to grant a decree of divorce to each is not true.
the court stated

-11-

In that

"There seems to be nothing in our stat1J!e
or in logic Lhar would prevent ci dissolt1lit>n
of the marriage by granting a divorc·p tt> both.
where the facts fault each equallv 3S re>spect
to grounds therefor. -- if such procedure would
make anybody happy."
This language is merely permissive and indicates
that the court

grant a decree to each party if their

fault is equal, but does not require that the fault be
equal in order to grant a decree to each.

The court goes on

to state:
"Whether one or the other or both should be
given a divorce should be left to the sound
discretion of the trial court based on the
evidence adduced."
In most cases, there is misconduct on the part of
both parties, but in very few,
each party exactly equal.

if any,

is the misconduct of

To require such a finding would

preclude the granting of a divorce decree to each party in
substantially every case.

The recognition of this concept

is set forth in the Utah case of Hendricks v. Hendricks,
123 U 178, 257 P2d 366, wherein the court stated:
"To affirm that a guilty spouse is never entitled to a divorce is a position difficult to
to apply to the facts of life.
It is seldom,
perhaps never, that any wholly innocent party
seeks a divorce against one who is wholly guilty.
Awareness of this fact and the giving of attention to the social implications of divorce has
given rise to various exceptions and limitations
on the doctrine of recrimination."
The language of the Hendricks case quoted by
Appellant to the effect that "the trial court would best
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r tr1rm
1r· Le

its function in the administration of justice by

rmining which party was least at fault, granting a

1ivorce, and adjusting their rights" is not mandatory and
still clearly leaves the discretion to the trial court.
The appropriate concept is recognized by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of Mackey v. Mackey,
420 P2d 516, wherein the Court stated:
"l. Our statute, 12 0.S.1961, Sec. 1275,
providing that where the parties appear to
be in equal wrong, a divorce shall be granted
to both parties, is no proscription against
granting a divorce to both parties where both
ask for a divorce and the evidence shows both
are at fault, although one was more in the
wrong than the other."

See also Izatt v. Izatt, Utah 627 P2d 49 (1981).
In the Utah case of McKean v. McKean, 544 P2d 1238
(1975), the court granted a decree of divorce to each of the
parties, and on appeal, the wife claimed that the divorce
should have been awarded to her alone.

The trial court made

no findings that the parties were equally at fault and the
Supreme Court stated:
"We have carefully reviewed the record in this
case and conclude that the record supports the
court's finding that each of the parties were
entitled to a divorce."
POINT II
: llE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DIVIDING THE
ASSETS OF THE PARTIES OR IN ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY TO APPELLANT.

Respondent has a difficult time determing what is

-13-

meant by Appellant's QUESTION OF L\\.C
paragraph from the case of Gramme v.

,\ppc·lld11L quotes
llL:!li,

)() /

\'.'<I

!

(1979) regarding the criteria in determining a reasonable
award for support and maintenance,

but does not indicate whcr

in she feels the trial court was in error.

It is not known

whether she objects to the division of assets ordered by the
court, or merely to the alimony award.
In the case of Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378,
431 P2d 802 (1967) this court stated:
"In reviewing the trial court's order in divorce
proceedings there are certain well established
principles to be borne in mind.
The findings
and order are endowed with a presumption of validity, and the burden is upon the appellant to
show they are in error.
Even though our constitutional provision, Section 9 of Article VIII,
states that in equity cases this court may review
the facts, we nevertheless take into account the
advantaged positition of the trial judge. Accordingly, we recognize that it is his prerogative to
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and in
case of conflict, we assume that the trial court
believed the evidence which supports the findings.
We review the whole evidence in the light most
favorable to them; and we will not disturb them
merely because this court might have viewed the
matter differently, but only if the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings."
The wife has not borne the burden of overcoming the
presumption of validity of the court's finding and order.
the basis of values established by husband's testimony,

On

the

wife was awarded property worth approximately $40,100.00, con
sisting of the home $34,100.00, furniture $5,000.00, 1967 Focl
$400.00, 1971 Dodge Colt $500.00, 1946 GMC pickup truck $100
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11,,,,hcrnd was awarded property worth approximately $34,150.00,
. '",is ting of equity in the home

$28, 100. 00, 1968 Ford pickup

truck $800.00, welding equipment $3,550.00, hand and power
tools $200.00,

firearms $400.00, camper $500.00, miscellaneous

scrap metal $500.00, and horseshoe equipment $100.00.
The significant differences in estimated values of
assets consist of the tools and equipment, the 1968 Ford pickup
truck, and the household furniture.

The husband's estimate

of the value of the welding equipment and tools is based primarily upon an appraisal made by an experienced and competent
welding equipment appraiser and dealer.

The wife's inflated

estimate of $39,216.00 was based on her personal opinion
of the replacement cost of the equipment, notwithstanding
that she has had no experience as a welder.
Her estimate that the value of the 1968 Ford pickup
truck is $2,500.00 is also grossly inflated when it is
recognized that this truck is 15 years old and she estimated
its value to be more than 12 times greater than the value she
placed on their one year older 1967 Ford automobile.
Her estimate of the value of the household furniture
at $600.00 is unrealistically low when it is recognized that
the appliances alone include three refrigerators, three deep
freezes,

four television sets, a microwave oven, a washer,

<irl'er, and four sewing machines.
The fact that the family home is to be sold in three

-15-

years and the wife to receive $6,000.00 more of the proceed'
than does the husband,

is not inequitable to the wife

It

should be remembered that the children of the parties are all
raised and this is by far the most substantial asset of the
parties.

The only fair way the parties can share in the

assets is for the home to be sold and the court treated the
wife more than fair in delaying the sale for three years.

In

most divorce easer, the husband is entitled to his equity in
the home at the time the youngest child reaches majority.
The court dealt equitably with the wife regarding the
civil service retirement benefits, holding in substance that
she should receive one-half of those benefits which accrued
during the marriage pursuant to the formula set forth in the
recent case of Woodward v. Woodward.
The award of alimony to wife is fair and equitable.
For three months after the trial date, she is to receive
approximately $695.00 per month, consisting of $150.00 per
month temporary alimony,

$205.00 per month house payment, and

utility payments which she testified total $340.00 per month
(R. 7).

For the next three years,

she is to receive alimony

in the form of her house payment of $205.00 per month, and
thereafter she receives $100.00 per month permanently.

This

is more than fair to the wife in view of the husband's net
monthly income of $1,159.68 (R. 24) and his own monthly

-16-

11ic;

expenses of $933.00 per month, including $273.00 per

1•1llnth payments on debts

totalling $2,000.00 (R. 24 & 25).

The trial court took into consideration the need
the wife claims to additional stomach surgery when he ordered
that the decree of divorce should not become final for three
months to enable the wife to take advantage of husband's group
medical insurance coverage through his employment, and the
granting of $695.00 per month financial assistance to her for
those three months.

Although the wife claims she was diagnosed

as needing this surgery four years ago, she has apparently
never been sufficiently ill to require that she obtain the
surgery.

To the date of this brief, she has still not had the

surgery.

Notwithstanding her testimony that she is on a

liquid diet. she stated that she eats potatoes, gravy, soup,
and sometimes meat, and that she has need for at least two
deep freezes in which to store her meat and vegetables (T.
151).

Her physical activities of playing softball, baseball,

bicycling, riding horses, coaching, unloading blocks, and
gardening, all raise question as to the validity of her
alleged health problems.

The trial court was correct in

finding that she is an employable person and that most
people with this kind of health condition are able to work.
recognizes this and testified that she has been seeking
emplovment (T.

158).
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With wife's past work experience,

she shuulrl be

able to obtain employment and upon sale of the family home
in three years,

she will have a substantial sum with which

to remake her life.
The trial court met well its responsibility set
forth in Wilson v. Wilson,

5 U 2d 79,

296 P2d 977 (1956),

wherein it is stated:
"The court's responsibility is to endeavor to
provide a just and equitable adjustment of their
ecomonic resources so that the parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful
basis."
CONCLUSION
The trial court was justified in granting a decree
of divorce to each party against the other, and made a fair
and equitable award of the property of the parties,

together

with reasonable provision for the maintenance of the wife
under the existing circumstances.
The judgment and decree of the trial court should
therefore be affirmed.

C. Gerald Parker
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOH
Attorneys for Defendant-Responde
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